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The negoTiaTion of several mega-TreaTies in 2015, 
including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Trans-Atlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the EU-Canada Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), and other regional agree-
ments, has generated substantial public discussion about the protec-
tions and privileges afforded to multinational enterprises through the 
investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism in these treaties. 
ISDS has increasingly raised concerns among certain governments and 
civil society groups, particularly as a growing number of ISDS cases 
involve investors challenging a range of governmental measures taken 
in good faith and in the public interest, including measures related to 
environmental protection, public health and safety, and financial stabil-
ity. Even representatives of international businesses – the purported 
beneficiaries of these texts – have voiced concerns about the costs of 
ISDS proceedings, uncertainty regarding outcomes of disputes, and 
an absence of rules to ensure the independence and impartiality of 
arbitrators. 
The TPP negotiating parties deflected the underlying concerns about 
ISDS by assuring constituents that ISDS would be included in the 
TPP in an improved “21st century” form, resolving the controversial 
elements. When the text of the TPP was released in November 2015, 
it became evident that while the ISDS mechanism in the TPP includes 
some changes around the margins, its basic elements remain generally 
unchanged. Therefore, a cost-benefit analysis of ISDS remains essen-
tial. There are two fundamental questions: Is ISDS effective or neces-
sary to produce its purported benefits? And do the potential benefits 
outweigh the costs? An analysis of ISDS as included in the TPP shows 
that the costs outweigh the alleged benefits, and alternative strategies 
should be employed to protect investors and promote the rule of law. 
Is ISDS Effective or Necessary to Produce Its 
Purported Benefits? 
ISDS is said to provide three core benefits: (1) increasing investment 
flows by providing potential investors additional security and protec-
tions, (2) depoliticizing investment disputes, and (3) improving the rule 
of law in the host state.
The first question is, therefore, is ISDS necessary or even effective in 
increasing investment flows and, if so, are these investments beneficial 
and to whom? 
After roughly ten years of scholarly and practical inquiry with increas-
ingly rigorous methodologies, there is no strong evidence that interna-
tional investment agreements (IIAs), much less ISDS, impact investment 
flows. The various empirical studies examining trends in FDI flows estab-
lish no clear statistical relationship between signing a treaty and receiv-
ing increased investment (see, e.g., Berger et al, 2013; Sauvant & Sachs, 
2009). Similarly, a survey of in-house counsel in large US multinationals 
revealed that IIAs do not play any significant role in foreign investment 
decisions (Yackee, 2010). Some of the largest cross-border investment 
flows take place in the absence of treaties, including between the US 
and China, India, Brazil and the United Kingdom; in fact, Brazil, a major 
capital importer and exporter, has no treaties in force with ISDS, nor 
does it plan to include ISDS in its future agreements.
Importantly, even the basic presumption that increased investment 
flows of all types will necessarily lead to positive development outcomes 
in the host country is wrong, since the benefits depend on the details of 
each investment (such as the sector, technologies transferred, and jobs 
created, among other factors). Indeed, the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC), a US government entity which provides political 
risk insurance to foreign investors, recognizes that only certain types 
of investment create development benefits. OPIC therefore screens 
investments seeking coverage to ensure that at least a minimum devel-
opment benefit is realized, and it prohibits support for projects that will 
result in harms in the host country. 
Even less certain is the extent to which increased outward investment 
would generate benefits for the home country and its constituents. 
While outward investment could result in increased capital income and 
tax revenues at home, it can also result in outsourcing of jobs and tax 
structuring to decrease tax liabilities. Again, OPIC and other government-
provided risk insurances recognize these potentially negative conse-
quences and shape their insurance policies and decisions accordingly. 
The TPP, like other treaties and the majority of tribunals interpreting 
those agreements, ignores the development impacts of investments 
that are afforded the benefits under the treaty, and it provides premi-
um-free political risk insurance to investments irrespective of their 
development impacts or negative effects at home or abroad.
Second, proponents of ISDS argue that it is important for “depoliticiz-
ing” investment disputes, freeing host states from diplomatic pressure 
and the threat of “gunboat diplomacy” and home states from having 
to advocate on behalf of their domestic firms. In fact, whether a home 
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state gets involved in an investor’s dispute with its host state does 
not vary based on whether or not there is a treaty with ISDS in place; 
a recent study found no evidence that countries that have signed 
an investment treaty with the United States face any less diplomatic 
pressure in investment disputes (Jandhyala et al., 2015). Notably, the 
TPP does not prohibit home states from exercising diplomatic pressure 
before, during, or after an investment claim has been filed. 
A third argument for ISDS is that this supra-national system strengthens 
the rule of law of treaty parties by reinforcing the importance of legal 
commitments. Yet, to the contrary, ISDS and investment treaties have 
been shown to weaken domestic rule of law (Ginsburg, 2005; see also 
Sattorova, 2014). The myriad reasons for this are elaborated below; the 
TPP, in its modifications, makes no attempt to correct for these failures. 
Therefore, none of the purported core benefits of ISDS (increased invest-
ment flows, depoliticizing disputes, or improving the rule of law in host 
states) has been effectively realized by the inclusion of ISDS in invest-
ment treaties. Proponents of the system, including the investors and the 
lawyers and arbitrators who have an interest in the system’s survival and 
growth, continue to tout these claims as the reason the mechanism is 
necessary, including in the TPP, but the empirical evidence continues 
to reveal that ISDS is neither effective nor necessary for achieving these 
benefits; indeed, these objectives can be realized through other means, 
as discussed below. 
Do the Purported Benefits of Investment Treaties 
Outweigh Their Costs?
The second fundamental question is what ISDS costs host governments 
and their constituents, and whether the purported benefits outweigh 
the costs. These costs include negative impacts on (a) domestic law, 
policy, and institutions, and (b) costs of litigation, liability, and loss of 
regulatory space. 
Costs Related to Domestic Law, Policy, and Institutions
Many ISDS claims are actually domestic law issues of administrative, 
contract, tort, or constitutional law that are merely removed from 
domestic legal institutions and processes and taken up in a parallel and 
specialized system available only to foreign investors, with fewer proce-
dural barriers and greater substantive protections. A foreign investor 
seeking to challenge conduct of the US government, for example, can 
take a substantive or procedural due process action, a contract action, 
an action governed by the Administrative Procedures Act, or a tort 
claim against the government, and decide whether to bring it under 
domestic law or as a violation of a treaty’s fair and equitable treatment 
(FET) provision — or both, in some cases. If the investor opts for ISDS 
instead of pursuing the domestic law claim, it can bypass all otherwise 
applicable procedural rules that may have complicated or frustrated 
its claim, including domestic rules of standing, statutes of limitation, 
requirements of exhaustion, doctrines of abstention, limits on judicial 
review, limits on available remedies, and rules regarding discovery, 
privilege, and evidence. Such domestic rules have been developed and 
refined over time and reflect important policy choices about the scope 
of public and private rights. 
In addition to creating a parallel and preferential legal system for foreign 
investors, ISDS actually creates and protects new property rights at a 
cost to the broader public interest. In a growing number of cases, tribu-
nals have created and restated a rule that specific representations or 
assurances given by government representatives can give rise to inves-
tors’ “legitimate expectations,” which are protected under the treaty’s 
FET obligation from government interference. Tribunals have protected 
“legitimate expectations” even when the official who made the relevant 
commitment did not have actual authority to bind the government 
or when the commitment did not comply with necessary procedural 
requirements. While the TPP states that a breach of investors’ “legitimate 
expectations” will not, standing alone, constitute a violation of the FET 
obligation, it suggests that investors’ “legitimate expectations” can still 
be a factor considered by tribunals when determining whether a state 
has breached its FET obligations, effectively creating and protecting 
“rights” that would not be recognized under domestic law.
From the rule of law perspective, ISDS also upsets the separation and 
balance of powers. If domestic legislation sets the scope of adminis-
trative officials’ ability to grant or define property rights, and adminis-
trative officials exceed that authority, a decision by a tribunal giving 
legal effect to the administrative officials’ actions overrides legislative 
dictates. Moreover, many projects that trigger investor–state disputes 
are projects in which negative impacts are concentrated at the local 
level, but benefits (e.g., increased tax revenue) are realized at the nation-
al level. Through its protection of “legitimate expectations,” ISDS allows 
investors to transform non-binding representations that favor their 
interests into rights protected under international law, weakening the 
voice and power of regulatory institutions and affected communities 
that might otherwise shape or constrain investors’ proposed projects. 
This parallel legal system also undermines the role of domestic institu-
tions and courts in their core responsibilities of developing, interpret-
ing, and applying the law. Particularly in common law jurisdictions 
where courts play a crucial role in shaping the substantive contours of 
the law over time, the ability of investors to sidestep domestic courts 
through recourse to ISDS effectively undercuts those domestic institu-
tions’ abilities to fulfill their important functions. 
The closed nature of ISDS disputes further exacerbates the problems 
created by this parallel legal system. Despite the public importance of 
these cases, disputes under most existing and many new IIAs are still 
litigated and decided or settled behind closed doors. While the TPP 
requires significant transparency of ISDS proceedings, and authorizes 
(but does not require) ISDS tribunals to accept amicus curiae submis-
sions from non-parties to the dispute, the interests and rights of 
non-parties can remain marginalized. Even if they will be affected by 
the treaty claims and outcomes, non-disputing parties have no legal 
rights to actually participate in the proceedings or shape the outcomes 
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of the disputes. While domestic law often has a number of ways in 
which interested and affected individuals and entities are protected, 
including by requiring judicial oversight of settlements, allowing those 
affected to participate in proceedings, or requiring dismissal of claims 
when such individuals or entities cannot be joined, ISDS, in contrast, 
contains no such safeguards.
The system of providing special protections for investors is based on 
the presumption that foreign investors face bias and discrimination in 
domestic legal systems. In reality, these fears are overstated. Only eight 
of the more than 600 known ISDS cases have successfully alleged a viola-
tion of the national treatment obligation (protecting foreign investors 
against discrimination in favor of domestic investors)1; and in not one of 
them did the tribunal find that there was intentional nationality-based 
discrimination against the foreign investor. Rather, in those eight cases, 
liability was usually based on strategic protection of domestic produc-
ers that negatively affected the foreign investor claimant, measures that 
can be and have been challenged in inter-state trade dispute settle-
ment mechanisms. In fact, studies show that foreign investors generally 
have greater power and influence over their host governments than 
domestic investors, particularly as governments around the world are 
competing for capital. The rational for establishing a privileged legal 
system for foreign investors is therefore based on an illusory threat. 
Thus, despite the assertion that ISDS strengthens the rule of law, the 
evidence is very much to the contrary. ISDS exacerbates inequality 
under the law by giving foreign investors access to a parallel and prefer-
ential legal system; diminishes the role of various government actors 
and institutions; and poses challenges to transparency and public 
participation. Moreover, to the extent that IIAs make it less risky for 
foreign investors to invest in jurisdictions with little respect for the rule 
of law, ISDS reduces incentives for governments to improve their invest-
ment climate, procedural fairness, domestic legal systems, and other 
aspects of the rule of law that would benefit domestic stakeholders as 
well. Overall, ISDS risks undermining rule of law objectives by upsetting 
and usurping the fundamental processes for developing, enforcing, 
and applying the law. 
Costs of Litigation, Liability, and Loss of Regulatory Space
Finally, there are the actual costs of ISDS litigation and liability and those 
that result from the loss of policy space. 
The costs of litigation and liability can be significant. Average costs of 
defending cases now approach $5 million, and even victorious states 
often are left to bear those fees (see Hodgson, 2014). ISDS awards, 
estimated by some to be roughly $75 million on average,2 can reach 
staggering sums, such as the $1.8 billion award in Occidental v. Ecuador 
and the $50 billion combined award in three closely related cases 
against Russia. While the TPP does contain some relatively new provi-
sions regarding allocation of costs and compensation in awards, those 
changes do not result in any meaningful changes for states in terms of 
exposure to costs of litigation and liability. 
While the costs that result from a loss of policy space are more diffi-
cult to assess and calculate, they are potentially even more damaging 
in their welfare effects. As Jonathan Bonnitcha’s recent analysis of the 
economic impacts of investment treaties suggests (Bonnitcha, 2014), 
investment protection through ISDS can discourage economically 
efficient government regulation in the public interest. 
Moving Forward: What Are the Alternatives?
Given that ISDS is not effective or necessary to achieve its intended 
benefits and that the costs are so substantial, its inclusion in treaties, 
including in the TPP, is unjustified. Yet if ISDS is removed from treaties, 
what recourse would foreign investors have for harm suffered due to 
host state conduct? Fortunately, there are other less costly and more 
appropriate mechanisms that can protect investor rights.
The first place 
for recourse for 
foreign investors 
should remain 
the domestic law 
system of the 
host countries, 
where all other domestic investors and stakeholders resolve their 
disputes. Debates around ISDS are premised on the false assumption 
that domestic systems are inadequate; in fact, many domestic legal 
systems do function well, particularly when exhaustion is required, 
giving governments the ability to correct lower level errors. In countries 
where legal systems and processes are weak, the focus of international 
agreements should be on strengthening those legal systems to ensure 
their robust development for all users, not undermining their develop-
ment by creating a parallel process and set of rules for select foreign 
investors. 
Second, investors can purchase additional protections through politi-
cal risk insurance, which is designed to price political risk on the market, 
sending a signal to both the investors and the host states about the 
security of investments in the host jurisdictions.3 If a particular jurisdic-
tion has a higher cost for political risk insurance, the host government will 
likely have the incentive to take steps to improve the investment climate 
for foreign investors, thereby strengthening rule of law incentives. 
A third avenue is through existing human rights mechanisms such as 
regional mechanisms established in Europe (the European Court of 
Human Rights), the Americas (the Inter-American Commission and 
Court for the Protection of Human Rights), and Africa (the African 
Court and Commission on Human and People’s Rights).4 These mecha-
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nisms are available to those aggrieved by government expropriations, 
discrimination, or denial of justice. To the extent that investors (or 
states) consider these mechanisms to be inadequate for resolving such 
claims, then as with inadequate domestic legal systems, the parties 
should take steps, through treaties and other collaborative means, to 
strengthen these human rights mechanisms for all stakeholders.
Fourth, as a last resort state parties may agree to treaty-based state-state 
dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve allegations of discriminatory 
or egregious treatment. There are plenty of precedents for robust, well-
functioning state-state dispute resolution mechanisms including that 
of the World Trade Organization.5 Similar legal mechanisms can be used 
for resolution of investment disputes. 
While it’s laudable that the drafters of the major mega-treaties have 
recognized the need for reform of the traditional ISDS model, much 
more could and should have been done in the TPP to create alterna-
tives to a fundamentally flawed system. The marginal changes that 
were made to ISDS in the TPP do not address the significant and justi-
fied concerns about that mechanism. The logic and evidence point 
to the need to drop ISDS altogether, and instead to strengthen and 
support national judicial processes and the rule of law, complemented, 
as necessary, through international human rights protections and state-
to-state dispute resolution.
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Endnotes
1 This analysis is based on the information available through UNCTAD’s 
Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator (“ISDS Navigator”) as of De-
cember 14, 2015, and a review of the cases the ISDS Navigator lists as 
finding a national treatment violation. The ISDS Navigator is accessible at 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS (updated as of September 
1, 2015). 
2 Estimates vary based on the datasets used, and the fact that many cases 
are not public. The figures above come from Hodgson (2014). They are 
based on data from cases with a public award as of December 31, 2012. 
They therefore do not include the $50 billion Yukos awards. 
3 Political risk insurance can be purchased from government and private 
entities. Government providers include entities established by individual 
home states (e.g., the US’s OPIC) and entities established by multilateral 
institutions (e.g., the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency). Private political risk insurance providers include Chartis, Lloyd’s, 
Sovereign, and Zurich. See, e.g., Wagner(2012).
4 For an overview of these systems, see, e.g., http://www.ijrcenter.org/
courts-monitoring-bodies/. 
5 For more information on the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism, see, 
e.g., https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm. 
